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CONVEYANCES, UNDER STAT. 2T ELIZ. CH. 4.
In a recent English case, -Doe d. Newman v. tRusham,' it was
held-
(1.) The statute 27 Eliz. c. 4, does not apply to the case of a
purchase for valuable consideration from the heir or devisee of one
who has made a voluntary conveyance of the same property in his
lifetime.
(2.) The principle upon which voluntary conveyances have been
held *audulent and void'as against subsequent purchasers for
value is, that by the sale the vendor so entirely repudiates the
former conveyance ap that, against himself and the purchaser for
value, it shall be conclusively taken that the intention to sell
existed when he made the voluntary conveyance, and that it was.
made in order to defeat the subsequent purchaser.
(3.) When the same person executes the voluntary conveyance,
and afterwards sells and cenveys the property, this principle
applies; but secus where the seller is a different person from him
who executed the voluntary conveyance, for the acts of one man
cannot shew the mind and intention of another.
Upon this well considered case of the Court of Queen's Bench,
the London Law Magazine,2 has a note, the importance of which
demands republication.
This case decides a point on which two great, authorities, Lord
St. Leonards (in his book on Vendors and Purchasers, 10th ed.
vol. iii. p. 280, and 11th ed. p. 928,) and Mr. Jarman (in his note
to Bythewood's Conveyancing, vol. viii. p. 144), appeared to be at
issue.
The question stood thus :-By the 27 Eliz. c. 4, a voluntary
conveyance is rendered void; and, by construction of law, even
where not actually so, fraudulent as against a subsequent bong
fide purchaser for value. Thus a voluntary settlement on B. by
121 L. . Q. B. 189; 9 Eng. L. & E. 410.
2 Vol. 48, p. 140.
VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCES.
A., who afterwards sells to C., is, as against C., fraudulent and
void; but whether it would be so on a sale by any one claiming
through A. is a point on which the above-cited authorities appear
entirely to differ; we say appear, because from the following
passages it will be seen that no difference as to some part (as, for
instance, the application in cases of actual fraud) exists:-
"Lord St. Leonards (as above quoted) thus expresses himself:-
'It has been holden that, although the fraudulent .conveyance is
not made by the vendor himself, yet it is void against a purchaser.
Therefore if a father make a fraudulent lease, and then die, and
the person claiming under him sell the estate, the purchase# shall
avoid the lease, whether the vendor did or did not know of its
existence;' giving as authority Burrell's case (6 Rep. 72), Jone8
v. Groobham (3 Co. Litt. 3 b), Warburton v. Loveland (1 Dow &
Clark, 497). This position seems, however, two pages further on,
to be virtually restrained to cases of actual fraud. 'But still the
rule has never been carried to this extent, that a father's bonafide
conveyance of the fee or of any partial interest, although volun-
tary. can be set aside by a sale. by the devisee or heir-at-law of the
father., The rule, properly confined to transactions reallyfraudu-
lent, or fraudulently kept on foot, seems to be open to no solid
objection, and it is not likely to be carried further.'
"On the' other hand, Mr. Jarman, after citing the first of the
above-quoted passages, together with the authorities adduced in
support of it, proceeds to observe, that ' the second of those cases
is not relevant to the learned author's position, but merely nega-
tived the application of the statute to the case of a lessee forging
a lease for a term longer than his owh, and selling the forged
lease. Burrell's case, however, is not so easily disposed of, for
the resolutions in that case certainly maintain the doctrine in
question; but the case itself, attentively examined, does not go so
far.. Though the resolutions of the Court go the whole length of
,maintaining that a settlement by a deceased owner may be avoided
by his heir, yet the determination of the Court does not 'involve
such a proposition.' Here Mr. Jarman proves his position by an
accurate statement of the facts in Burrell's case, which is also done
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by Lord Campbell, C. J., in the subject of this note :-' But by far
the strongest argument against the construction in question, may
be drawn from the import and terms of the statute itself, which
vacates conveyances, &c., made for the intent and of purpose to
defraud and deceive purchasers;' which words necessarily imply
that the conveyance and the sale proceed from the same person;
for how is the intent to defraud purchasers to be collected or infer-
red from the mere act of making a settlement, unless the settlor
afterwards disposes of the same lands to a purchaser ? Where a
man settles lands, and afterwards sells them, the law, looking
simultaneously'at the several acts, sees the motive for the one in the
other. The sale shows quo animo the previous settlement was exe-
cuted; but if there is no sale, upon what is the inference of fraudu-
lent intention to be built? Certainly not upon the sale by the
heir, over whose acts the settlor has no control, and to disinherit
whom might have been his sole object in making the canveyance
settlement.'
"It will be seen, on an attentive perusal of the passages in which
these contending opinions are expressed, that the difference is not
so great as it would at first sight seem to be, and that what exists,
springs chiefly from taking the adverse position into consideration
without the limitations engrafted upon it.
"The point at issue, however, whether large or narrow, had been
decided by the Irish Court of Exchequer in accordance with the
views expressed (not indeed as the author's own, so much as the
result of the authorities) in the Vendors and Purchasers, in the case
of Jones v. TWhittaker (Lopg. & Towns. 14), which was cited as a
direct authority (and that it was such was conceded by Lord Camp-
bell,'C. J.) for the defendant in this case, the facts of which may
be concisely stated to be as follows :-J. N. voluntarily settled the
disputed lands (after his own death) upon S. N. for life, with
remainder to the lessor of the plaintiff in fee. J. N. subsequently
devised them to S. N. for life, with remainder to one T. 11. in fee.
After J. N.'s death, S. N. and T. M. sold to the defendant. S. N.
having died, the ejectment was brought, in which Martin, B.,
directed a verdict for the plaintiff, subject to leave reserved to
VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCES.
move to enter it for the defendant. A rule nisi, obtained for this
purpose in Easter Term, 1851, was discharged in Hilary Term of
this year, Lord Campbell, C. J., stating as the reason for the
delay, 'We have deferred giving judgment in this case for several
terms from our respect for the decision of the Irish Court of Ex-
chequer in Jones v. Whittaker, and from a desire, after an atten-
tive examination of all the authorities upon the subject, to state
fully the grounds on which we feel ourselves bound to differ from
that decision.'
"Now, although the decision thus expressed in the judgment,
'we are all clearly of opinion that a purchaser frbm the devisee
of one who has made a voluntary conveyance in his lifetime is not
within the statute,' is there limited to the case before the Court of
a sale by the ' devisee,' still the following dicta, viz. :-1. ' If there
are two voluntary conveyances, the purchaser under the second
takes noiing;' per Lord Campbell, C. J. 2. ' The statute does not
operate until a deed for valuable consideration has been executed
(i. e. by the settlor), and that divests all the estate of the voluntary
grantee;' per Coleridge, J. 3. 'A voluntary conveyance is not
fradulent per se; it only becomes so when the conveyor subse-
quently conveys for value: but a sale by the devisee cannot affect
the conveyance of his testator;' per Patteson, J. ;-seem to stamp
the remarks of Mr. Jarman with the seal of eminent authority, and
show clearly that, if the subsequent sale had been by the heir, the
decision would have been to the same effect. This is further made
manifest in the judgment, where, after stating the facts in Burrell's
case, and the first resolution there come to, Lord Campbell, C. J.,
adds, 'The resolution is entitled to great respect; but as it goes
beyond what is required by the facts of the case, we do not con-
sider it to be conclusive; and further, the second resolution in
Burrell's case is quite in accordance with the view we have just
taken; for it is there said, 'It was resolved that although the
father had nothing in the inheritance of the land at the time of
the assignment of his term,' but the whole estate of inheritance was
in the grandfather, yet when the grandfather died, and the father-
sold the land, his vendee shall avoid the said term by the said act
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(the said assignment on the evidence being taken to be fraudulent);
for if he had bargained and sold the said term only, the bargainee
should have avoided the said fraudulent assignment, and by con-
veyance the vendee of the whole fee-simple shall avoid it.' Now,
if the term only had been sold, it would plainly have been sold by
the same nperson who made the fraudulent assignment.' Now it is
entirely upon that first resolution in Burrell's case, that Lord St.
Leonards' opinion and the decision in Jones v. ihittaker rest.
All the mischief was produced by deference to the supposed autho-
rity of that case. But in the very recent case of Bichards v.
Lewis (20 Law J. C. P..177), Jervis, C. J., had observed, 'Bur-
rell's case is misunderstood. It does not appear that the Courts at
that time held mere voluntariness a badge of fraud; they do not
say every voluntary deed is fraudulent;' and, quoting the case
related by Popham, C. J. (in fine, Burrells case), added, ' It is
clear from this that cases of actual fraud were alone in their con-
sideration..... ... There was fraud in fact there, and not merely
fraud in law.' And in the same case, Williams, J., says, 'As to
the mortgage, Burrell's case, if good law, shows that where there
is actual fraud in a conveyance, a subsequent purchase from one
not guilty of the fraud, is protected ; but that case has no arplica-
tion where the fraud is only constructive;' and, the same learned
judge had before asked, whether ' Where there is no actual fraud,
the revoking conveyance must not be made by the same person
who made the voluntary conveyance.' We may observe, by way
of conclusion, that these passages were quoted with approval, and
adopted in the judgment of Lord Campbell in the present case,
which, as it was the result of long and attentive consideration, and
as it agrees with the opinion of the Court of Common Pleas, must
be lboked upon as of great authority, and as settling the points at
issue.
"With regard to a totally different point, th6 authority of Irish
decisions in English Courts, it is also valuable as a clear enuncia-
tion of judicial opinion. Some misunderstanding had arisen from
the former rejection of some Irish case upon practice as an autho-
rity, which, as Irish and English rules of practice differ, it could
